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A Value of Statistical Life (VSL) is used in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a monetary measure of the 
benefits to people from small risk reductions that arise from safety projects.  Despite its widespread use in a 
number of countries, the concept of a VSL remains controversial, not least because it implies acceptance of 
the underlying ethical assumptions of CBA together with the idea that ‘social welfare’ can be measured and 
aggregated in some manner.  In addition, to comply with theory, variable VSLs for different groups within 
society would be advocated.  However, without fail, empirically, it is the case that those countries that 
employ a willingness to pay based approach to benefit-cost analysis of a safety project appraisal tend to use 
a single value for that accident context that is independent of the per capita income level, or indeed other 
personal characteristics, of the sub-group in society to which the safety improvement will actually apply.  
This article presents a straightforward, but theoretically justified adaptation to the calculation of a VSL 
which allows empirical practice by policymakers i.e. the application of a “common” VSL for any particular 
hazard within a given society, to be compatible with a CBA decision making approach.    
 





It is becoming increasingly common practice in developed countries for government 
agencies to employ willingness to pay (WTP) – based values of safety in transport project 
appraisal and, indeed, in the case of several other hazards such as air pollution, fire 
safety, or flood risks.  For example, in the UK the Department for Transport and other 
public sector agencies use a WTP-based Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) of roughly ₤1.5 
million for all causes of death except cancer, where a value twice this size is applied1.  
 
It is important to stress that a VSL is not a price on life or the value of preventing the 
death of one person.  Instead a VSL is used in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a monetary 
measure of the benefits to people from small risk reductions that arise from safety 
projects.  The VSL is derived by assuming a large group of n individuals who are 
presented with the opportunity in the forthcoming time period to reduce the risk of death 
by 1/n per person through the introduction of a safety improvement project.  Jones-Lee 
(1989) and Viscusi (1998) show that, in this case, the mathematical expectation of lives 
saved is ‘1’. 
 
The purpose of CBA within safety policy is to facilitate resource allocation by attempting 
to make explicit any changes in social welfare arising from implementation of such 
policies. The ethical principles underlying the measurement of this change in social 
welfare within CBA are no more restrictive than the assumption that peoples’ preferences 
should be accounted for through utility indices that must increase if a policy is to be 
welfare improving. The principle of Pareto efficiency guides CBA.  It states that an 
allocation of resources is Pareto efficient if no alternative allocation could make any 
individual better off without making at least one individual worse off.  Ideally, safety 
policymakers, given appropriate information on social welfare, would be able to rank 
safety polices (with their associated Pareto efficient allocations) to identify the best 
policy i.e. the one delivering the highest social welfare.   
                                                 
1 This is to take some account of the fact that a cancer death is preceded by a period – sometimes protracted 




Unfortunately, Arrow’s (1973) Impossibility Theorem demonstrates that it is extremely 
difficult to derive a complete and consistent choice rule exclusively from individual 
preferences.  Nevertheless, it is still possible to judge the benefits of a safety policy 
(captured by the VSL), and hence the allocation it produces, relative to a situation where 
no safety policy was introduced i.e. the baseline, or status-quo.   Thus, while it may be 
very difficult to see the top of the mountain that we are trying to climb, it is nonetheless 
fairly easy to know whether or not we are moving in an upwards direction. 
 
It is also almost certainly the case that many safety polices do not create direct Pareto 
improvements.  Instead, there are winners and losers.  For example, speedbumps on roads 
reduce the risk of fatalities but add to journey time.  How to aggregate such gains and 
losses?  The ethical principle underlying the aggregation process within CBA is that a 
policy is said to create a Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) if the winners i.e. general 
road users, could in principle make a compensating transfer to the losers i.e. car drivers 
such that the former are at least as well off as they were without the speed bump (ex post, 
they have reduced their risk of death due to the speed bump but would have sacrificed 
income to car drivers to compensate them).  Meanwhile, the losers ex post are no worse 
off, since the inconvenience of the slower journey time would be compensated for by the 
increased income.  Whether any transfers actually take place is an empirical question for 
policymakers.  In theory, for CBA to comply with these ethical underpinnings, it is 
merely sufficient that the possibility exists for a PPI. 
 
In order to identify whether a safety policies generates a PPI, it is necessary to translate 
any physical impacts into a common unit of measurement to aggregate gains and losses 
across individuals.   By observing, or asking, a person’s willingness to trade risk 
reductions for money (effectively a metric for all other goods) we can place a money 
value on the benefits of these risk reductions to the individual.  If the gain to the 
individual is positive, willingness to pay (WTP) is elicited.  If the gain is negative i.e. a 
loss, then willingness to accept (WTA) is a more appropriate measure.  However, given 
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that safety is typically viewed as a normal good2 - at least for small risk reductions – 
WTP values for a risk reduction is elicited from a sample of the affected population and 
aggregated to generate a VSL3.  
 
Assuming a policy can generate a PPI, then aggregating these benefits would generate a 
so-called ‘social surplus’.  The issue is whether this is a reasonable proxy for social 
welfare? If not, it would be of little use in a CBA.  Economists express social welfare in 
terms of a social welfare function which, although merely an analytical construct, 
provides a powerful framework within which to assess the impact on peoples’ wellbeing 
of various exogenous changes, in our case a safety policy.  Much attention has been paid 
to developing notions of social welfare that might be considered reasonable and 
consistent with the PPI criteria.   A discussion of this is clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper, but suffice to say that most CBA are underpinned by a very general form of social  
welfare function, 
 
W = W(u1, u2,…um) 
 
where u1, u2,…um are the utilities of the  m individuals in the economy.  Aggregate social 
welfare is simply a summation of these (unweighted) utilities.  A variation on this is the 











where the weight αi  reflects the ‘importance’ of individual i to overall social welfare.  
This is most often employed to allow decision makers to effectively treat the marginal 
social welfare of income as being constant across all individuals in society.  This means 
that a $1 gain or loss for a poor person is treated as having exactly the same impact on 
                                                 
2 In that people have some positive value on additional increments, within the range under consideration. 
3 It remains an open question as to whether VSL could reasonably be adapted and applied to high cost, low 
probability events.  While it may be true that peoples’ cognitive limitations may preclude eliciting a reliable 
WTP, more fundamentally it would require  substantial theoretical advances and adaptations that are clearly 
beyond the bounds of this article. 
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social welfare as the same gain or loss for a rich person (see for example, Jones-Lee, 
1989 p.33). 
 
In the context of a VSL the elicited WTP serves as a proxy for these utilities from the risk 
reduction, indicating for each individual her/his marginal rate of substitution of income 
for risk of death (i.e. the rate at which the individual will trade their money income for 
risk reduction), mi.  Under current practice, the arithmetic mean of WTP for the affected 
group is then taken as the VSL. 
 
The empirical implication of this is perhaps slightly unpalatable. Effectively, it implies a 
higher VSL for richer members of society than for poorer members of the same society.  
The same point can be made in respect of age (VSLyoung > VSLold) since WTP tends to 
decline with age. 
 
However, we are hard pressed to identify any cases where governments apply this 
theoretically justifiable type of differentiation4. Instead, for any given context – such as 
road transport – common values are typically applied across the whole of society, 
regardless of the income level, age-band or any other personal or cultural characteristics 
of the specific group affected.  
 
In spite of this tendency to apply a uniform VSL in any given context, so far as we are 
aware no satisfactory theoretical foundation has so far been provided that justifies the 
application of a common WTP-based VSL equal to, say, the overall population arithmetic 
mean of individual marginal rates of substitution (MRS) of wealth for risk of death by a 
given cause, other than under conditions which from a practical point of view appear 
somewhat implausible (see, for example, Bergstrom, 1982 or Dehez and Drèze, 1982)..  
Baker et al. (2008) explore in detail the kind of axiomatic foundation required to justify 
                                                 
4 One notable exception is apparently Health Canada which, according to Alberini et al. (2002), applies a 
VSL equal to only 75% of its “standard” value to those aged 65 and over. In addition, in the UK at least 
some healthcare allocative decisions are based upon the so-called “Quality-Adjusted Life Year” (or 
“QALY”) methodology, together with a WTP-based value of a life-year. Strictly applied i.e. using a 
constant QALY, this procedure will clearly also differentiate between patients on the basis of remaining 
life expectancy and hence age. However, Jones-Lee et al.(2007) show that with the use of a varying QALY 
(one that increases with age) this will not necessarily be the case. 
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equal valuation with a view to establishing what would in fact constitute a plausible 
normative rationale for the uniform monetary valuation of safety for any given type of 
risk.  This effectively relaxes the assumption of constant marginal utility of income and 
instead assumes constant marginal welfare of survival probability5.   
 
In this paper, we present a practical and theoretically justifiable method based on this 
framework that social decision makers can use to calculate a common VSL that remains 
consistent with CBA but unaffected by the particular distributional and demographic 
characteristics of that society, if so desired. 
 
2. A Framework for a Common VSL 
 
Consider a society of n individuals, each with a survival probability for a forthcoming 
period. Then suppose that the objective is to maximize a weighted-additive utilitarian 
social welfare function of the form:  
 





∑                (1) 
 
where V is an index of overall social welfare (or “value”); ui(wi, pi) is the i
th individual’s 
cardinal utility of wealth, wi, and survival probability, pi, for the forthcoming period and 
the ai are distributional weights
6.  
 
Underlying this social welfare function in conventional CBA are two important 
assumptions, namely that marginal social welfare of income is constant across individuals 
(i.e. $1 buys the same amount of utility for a rich and a poor individual) and, further, that 
                                                 
5 The interested reader is directed to Baker et al. (2008) for  a detailed technical exposition of the outcome 
of this change in assumptions (i.e. a common VSL) and the axiomatic conditions that the underlying social 
welfare function must comply with. 
6
 This is essentially the type of Benthamite utilitarian social welfare function proposed in Harsanyi (1955) 
and Broome (1991). 
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the marginal social welfare of survival probability varies (i.e. a risk reduction generates 
different changes in utility for different individuals).  In a break with these conventional 
CBA assumptions, Baker et al. (2007) show that if instead it is assumed that the marginal 
social welfare of survival probability is constant, this provides an axiomatic foundation 
for a common VSL.  In conjunction with this assumption, we now show that for any 
public projects funded by lump sum taxes, it is possible to calculate a common VSL that 
can still be considered consistent with the tenets of CBA. 
 
Consider a safety improvement financed by uniform per capita lump sum tax, x, levied on 
everyone in a society comprising n individuals.   In the following, δ defines a small 
(marginal) change so, for example, if pi is the probability of an event occurring for 
individual I, then p
i
δ denotes a small change in the probability of occurrence of that 
event for individual i. 
 
Thus, we denote p
i
δby   the reduction in probability of death that is just large enough to 
ensure that paying tax x and enjoying risk reduction p
i
δ  leaves i
th  individual no worse 
off then necessarily: 
 




im  is the i’th individual’s marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of wealth for 
risk of death i.e. the rate at which the individual i is willing to trade off wealth against the 
risk of his or  her premature death. 
 
By rearranging algebraically, we can establish the size of the risk reduction that will just 
be sufficient to make it worth x to the individual, that is:  






−−−−== 21δ    ----------------------------------------(2) 
 
It then follows that the expected number of lives saved by the risk reduction is given by: 
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Σ=Σ δ ----------------------------------------------------------(3) 
 
which is the same as: 





Σ  ------------------------------------------------------(4) 
 
In addition, aggregate WTP for the risk reduction is equal to nx.  It then follows that 
aggregate WTP per statistical fatality prevented (VSL) is given by: 
 








=   ----------------------------------------------(5) 
 
and canceling x from the numerator and denominator gives  









which is, by definition, the harmonic mean7, m,m̂ iof   
 
Notice also that if the social welfare function is structured so that marginal social welfare 
of survival probability is constant across all i, then, provided risk reductions continue to 
prevent one statistical fatality, these risk reduction can be re-distributed in any way and 




Under standard (unweighted) social cost-benefit analysis the so-called “VSL” or value 
accorded to a safety improvement that will prevent one “statistical fatality” (i.e. that will 
                                                 
7 In the context of VSL, the more commonly used arithmetic mean is simply the sum of individual mi’s 
divided by the number of individuals.  The harmonic mean is simply a different kind of average.  Thus, the 
















ˆ i.e. the reciprocal of the arithmetic 
mean of the reciprocal of individual mi’s. 
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generate small individual risk reductions which reduce the mathematical expectation of 
the number of fatalities by one) is given by the arithmetic mean of individual marginal 
rates of substitution of wealth for the risk of death by the cause concerned, where this 
mean is taken over the group of people affected by the safety improvement. To the extent 
that these marginal rates of substitution will typically depend upon the income, age and 
other personal characteristics of those affected by the safety improvement, the logic 
underpinning standard cost-benefit analysis would seem to require that the VSL 
employed in the evaluation of a safety improvement that affects a poorer (or older) group 
in society should be smaller than the value applied to a wealthier (or younger) group. 
 
But in those countries that do in fact use values of safety based on willingness-to-pay, no 
such differentiation actually occurs and instead a common VSL – independent of income, 
age, or other personal characteristics – is typically applied in the evaluation of safety 
projects in any particular context (such as road transport). Clearly, though, if a normative 
rationale is to be provided for this “uniform valuation of safety” approach then this will 
have to rely upon value judgments that differ somewhat from those underpinning 
conventional social cost-benefit analysis. This paper provides such a rationale and has 
demonstrated that, at least for small variations in wealth and the risk of death, a 
framework for a common VSL can be formulated and easily applied (by simply 
calculating the harmonic, rather than the arithmetic mean).   
 
In closing, we note that VSL is a probabilistic approach to risk management and therefore 
incorporates randomness into the framework, in the sense that human behaviour can 
never be fully controlled and accidents will continue to happen to a priori anonymous 
members of society.  Under this approach zero risk (a non-marginal change) is infeasible.  
This contrasts with the approach of Vision Zero (Johansson, 2008) which is essentially 
deterministic in nature and therefore holds out the possibility that because all human 
behaviour is in some way causal, it is possible to reduce risk to zero.  Whilst on the face 
of it the two approaches may appear to be incompatible, on careful reflection, from a 
purely practical point of view we see no reason why the two tools cannot be used in 
conjunction with each other by risk managers.  Indeed, we see the VSL framework as 
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actually aiding in resource allocation if society adopts a Vision Zero approach.  A VSL 
framework allows the risk manager to assess the benefits of the next iteration (i.e. safety 
project) compared to the costs. The result of this may help in determining the appropriate  
timeframe for implementation since it seems to us an unavoidable fact of economic life 
that one extra safety project means another, perhaps equally worthwhile, project 
elsewhere must be given up in a resource constrained world.  While risk behaviour may 
or may not be ultimately deterministic in nature, it would become increasingly costly to 
deliver marginal safety improvements as a country progressed down the long road to 
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